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REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MISSION TO SOMALIA
ON 26 AND 27 OCTOBER 1994

Letter of transmittal

Letter dated 3 November 1994 from the members of the Security Council mission to Somalia addressed to the President of the Security Council

We have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council's mission to Somalia, which took place on 26 and 27 October 1994. The report is submitted to the Security Council in accordance with a decision taken by the Council during informal consultations on 20 October 1994.

(Signed) WANG Xuexian
(China)

(Signed) Hervé LADSOUS
(France)

(Signed) Colin KEATING
(New Zealand)
(Chairman)

(Signed) Isaac E. AYEWAH
(Nigeria)

(Signed) Kamran NIAZ
(Pakistan)

(Signed) Yuriy V. FEDOTOV
(Russian Federation)

(Signed) Karl F. INDERFURTH
(United States of America)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In resolution 946 (1994) of 30 September 1994, the Security Council declared its readiness to consider sending a mission of the Council to Somalia at an appropriate time to convey directly to the Somali political parties the views of the Council on the situation in Somalia and on the future of the United Nations presence there.

2. At the consultations of the whole held on 20 October 1994, the Security Council decided to send such a mission, which would depart for Somalia on 24 October 1994. At that time, the Council adopted an informal document entitled "Somalia: guidelines for Security Council mission" (see annex I).

3. The mission of the Security Council was led by Mr. Colin Keating, Permanent Representative of New Zealand to the United Nations. Other members of the mission were Mr. Wang Xuexian (China), Mr. Hervé Ladsous (France), Mr. Isaac E. Ayewah (Nigeria), Mr. Kamran Niaz (Pakistan), Mr. Yuriy V. Fedotov (Russian Federation) and Mr. Karl F. Inderfurth (United States of America). The mission was assisted by two United Nations Secretariat staff: Ms. Elisabeth Lindenmayer (Department of Peace-keeping Operations) and Mr. Shigeru Mochida (Department of Political Affairs).

4. Prior to its arrival in Somalia, the mission members prepared a statement to be delivered to Somali faction leaders (see annex II).

5. The mission visited Somalia on 26 and 27 October. Its programme of work (see annex III) included meetings with Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Spokesman for the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), and General Mohamed Farah Aidid, Chairman of the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) (see annexes IV and VI). The mission received briefings on recent political developments from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, H.E. Mr. James Victor Gbeho, and on the military aspects of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) operation relevant to withdrawal from the Force Commander, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar. The mission also had a meeting with representatives of United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) operating in Somalia (see annex IX). In Nairobi, the mission had the opportunity to exchange views with the representatives of the Horn of Africa countries (see annex VIII) and the members of the Security Subcommittee of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) (see annex X). The Chairman and the members of the mission also held a press conference each, in Mogadishu and Nairobi respectively.

II. ACTIVITIES OF THE MISSION

6. The mission's arrival in Mogadishu on 26 October coincided with consultations being held by factions allied with Mr. Ali Mahdi in North Mogadishu, and by factions associated with General Aidid in South Mogadishu, following the issuance of the memorandum on 14 October by General Aidid's USC/SNA and 11 other factions, calling for the convening of a national reconciliation conference on 27 October 1994.

A. Briefings by UNOSOM II

1. Briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

7. On 26 October, Ambassador Gbeho briefed the mission on current political developments. In particular, the mission was apprised of his intensive efforts to discourage General Aidid from convening a national reconciliation conference without the participation of those factions allied with Mr. Ali Mahdi. The mission was informed of General Aidid's decision to reschedule the convening of such a conference to 1 November 1994, which had been communicated to the Special Representative only a few hours prior to the mission's arrival in Mogadishu.

8. According to the Special Representative, the only remaining obstacle to the convening of an inclusive national reconciliation conference was actually the procedural question regarding who should be represented and take the decision to establish a Government. In his observation, there was already a broad agreement to stop fighting, to convene a national reconciliation conference and to establish a national Government by the end of the year. He felt that one solution to the question of participation might be for both sides to agree to set up a credentials committee as is often customary with conferences. This idea apparently was acceptable to Mr. Ali Mahdi but not to General Aidid. The Special Representative was concerned that General Aidid would unilaterally proceed with convening a national reconciliation conference on 1 November and declare a Government, which, in his assessment, would invite renewed fighting. He urged the mission to counsel the factions strongly to proceed on the basis of an inclusive approach to national reconciliation.

2. Briefing by the Force Commander

9. The Force Commander's briefing on 26 October covered an overview of the current deployment and operation of UNOSOM II troops; the security conditions in each area of responsibility of UNOSOM II in southern Somalia; the current status of force reduction, its effects and existing vulnerabilities, including a review of recent cases of withdrawal from outlying areas that involved the forced transfer of assets to local parties; UNOSOM II's assistance to the Somali police; and the withdrawal planning scenarios and support requirements. The Force Commander made a special reference to the fact that the flow of arms into Somalia was continuing unabated despite the Security Council's arms embargo.

10. The members of the mission focused on the details of withdrawal and practical difficulties associated with it, in particular implications on time requirements for completion of the withdrawal. The Force Commander explained that the estimated requirement of 120 days for withdrawal assumed the continuation of current security conditions and the availability of shipping and offshore support from Member States, including hospital ships and amphibious support. According to the Force Commander, an emergency withdrawal could be accomplished much more quickly. An intermediate scenario was also outlined. He made it clear that, if any of the assumptions changed, then the time required for withdrawal would also change. He further indicated that the kind of support asked of Member States would depend on what UNOSOM II needed to take out of

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Somalia. He stated, in that connection, that he would advise the Security Council through the Secretary-General if the situation changed for the worse.

B. Meetings with Somali faction leaders

1. Meeting with Mr. Ali Mahdi and faction leaders associated with him

11. On 26 October 1994, the Security Council mission, accompanied by the Special Representative, held a meeting with Mr. Ali Mahdi and 13 faction leaders (see annex IV) associated with him under SSA. These 13 faction leaders included the chairmen of several signatory factions to the Addis Ababa agreement, those of a few new factions and even a "new chairman" of USC/SNA who, according to Mr. Ali Mahdi, had replaced General Aidid. The joint statement addressed to the mission by Mr. Ali Mahdi and his colleagues is reproduced in annex V.

12. H.E. Mr. Colin Keating, Chairman of the mission, read out the message of the Security Council, prepared on the basis of the guidelines adopted by the Council. The texts of the message and the guidelines, the title of which had been adjusted to read "Elements of presentation made by the Security Council mission", were subsequently presented to Mr. Ali Mahdi.

13. The message of the Security Council was well received by Mr. Ali Mahdi and the faction leaders present. In responding to the message on behalf of his colleagues, Mr. Ali Mahdi assured the mission of their continued cooperation with the Secretary-General and the Security Council. He stated that SSA factions had never been involved in any confrontation with the United Nations and he pledged that SSA would cooperate in the phasing out of the military component of UNOSOM, but added that it would also seek the cooperation and assistance of the United Nations in the reconstruction of Somalia. He appealed to the international community not to abandon Somalia only because of the obstructive policies of one of the faction leaders. The Chairman and members of the mission, while noting the assurances of cooperation expressed by Mr. Ali Mahdi, reminded him and his colleagues that in the coming weeks, the Security Council would be monitoring the situation in Somalia to judge if their words were matched by actual developments on the ground.

2. Meeting with General Aidid and faction leaders associated with him

14. On 27 October 1994, the Security Council mission, accompanied by the Special Representative, met with General Aidid and 12 other faction leaders (see annex VI) currently associated with him, including the leaders of 4 splinter groups of the signatories to the Addis Ababa agreement. The memorandum jointly prepared by these 13 factions was presented to the mission. The text of the memorandum is reproduced in annex VII.

15. Ambassador Keating made a statement identical to that delivered earlier to Mr. Ali Mahdi and the SSA, conveying the message of the Security Council. In underlining the importance the mission attached to an inclusive national

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reconciliation conference, he added that any regime that would emerge from a non-inclusive national reconciliation conference could not expect to acquire legitimacy or recognition in the eyes of the international community. The texts of the message and the guidelines (Elements of presentation made by the Security Council mission) were subsequently presented to General Aidid.

16. In response to the message, General Aidid said that he and his colleagues were determined to resolve the Somali crisis and that they would do everything possible to ensure that the remaining influential leaders were represented at the national reconciliation conference. However, he added that the 13 leaders present represented 95 per cent of the population of Somalia and would, therefore, proceed with the conference even if the remaining leaders did not join. He explained that the Somalis should not be expected to secure 100 per cent support of the population before forming a Government, since such was not the case elsewhere in the world.

17. On behalf of his colleagues, General Aidid assured the mission that they would protect the personnel and property of UNOSOM during the phasing out of UNOSOM II. He also assured them that UNOSOM and other international personnel would be treated with respect as they were considered guests of the Somali people. General Aidid added that Somalia needed the assistance of international NGOs and would ensure their protection following the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, and he repeatedly expressed the hope that the United Nations and the international community would continue to assist Somalia with reconstruction and other areas after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II.

18. Responding to questions from members of the mission regarding participation in the conference by Mr. Ali Mahdi, from whom they had detected a sense of willingness to enter into dialogue with General Aidid, the latter informed the mission that he and his colleagues would welcome Mr. Ali Mahdi's participation in the conference through USC, led by Mr. Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, and that he could also join the broad-based Government by competing for a post as a member of Somali society and as a member of the Central Committee of USC.

19. While expressing appreciation for the assurances given with respect to the establishment of a broad-based Government and the security of UNOSOM II during withdrawal and of humanitarian assistance activities after that, the Chairman and members of the mission stated to General Aidid and his colleagues that the international community would be observing with keen interest the situation on the ground to determine whether or not the assurances given in the meeting would be matched with deeds, and that the United Nations and the international community would be judging the worthiness of future cooperation with Somalia based on such cooperation as they would receive. In particular, the mission urged General Aidid and his colleagues to use the coming few days to ensure that the conference would be inclusive, and stated that the Security Council would give its full support to the Special Representative in his efforts to provide channels of communication and to facilitate reconciliation among the Somali factions.

C. Meeting with the representatives of the Horn of Africa countries

20. On 27 October in Nairobi, the mission, at its request, met with the representatives of the Horn of Africa countries, namely Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and the Sudan (see annex VIII), to brief them on its mandate and the result of its visit to Somalia. The members of the mission stressed the importance that the Security Council attached to cooperation with regional organizations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as well as with the neighbouring countries of Somalia. The representatives of the Horn of Africa countries assured the mission that neighbouring countries had always expressed their willingness to be involved in addressing the problem of Somalia, that they were already playing a role and that they would continue to do so.

21. Ambassador Keating laid particular emphasis on the fact that the mission's message to the faction leaders had been that a national reconciliation conference had to be genuinely inclusive, that there could not be any artificial exclusion of concerned Somali parties, and that the international community would judge the legitimacy of any regime that would emerge from the conference from such a perspective.

22. In view of the possible consequences of failure to achieve national reconciliation in Somalia and of the special leverage that the neighbouring countries have with the Somali factions, the members of the mission urged cooperation between the United Nations and the Horn of Africa countries, including in making the existing arms embargo on Somalia effective. Such cooperation should be aimed at promoting national reconciliation by discouraging a non-inclusive, and encouraging an inclusive, national reconciliation conference and an interim Government in Somalia.

D. Meeting with United Nations agencies and NGOs and the Somalia Aid Coordination Body

23. On 27 October 1994, the mission met with representatives from United Nations agencies and international NGOs in Mogadishu (see annex IX). They expressed appreciation of UNOSOM II's contribution to the protection of aid convoys, guarding of ports, etc. They understood the inevitability of UNOSOM II's withdrawal and stated their realization that, in the long run, they must conduct their activities without UNOSOM II's assistance. While declaring their commitment to continue their work even after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II, they all shared the concern that security conditions in Somalia would worsen following withdrawal. Some expressed a desire for some form of assistance in that regard during the transitional period leading to and immediately after withdrawal and for access to certain UNOSOM physical assets. Others disagreed. In general, value was seen in an ongoing United Nations presence.

24. In response to queries about the withdrawal plan, the Special Representative pledged to brief the agencies and NGOs at the next meeting with them now that UNOSOM II had a draft withdrawal plan. He took the opportunity to assure the representatives that UNOSOM II included all international staff of

agencies and NGOs in its emergency withdrawal plan, should that become necessary.

25. Also on 27 October 1994, the mission met with the members of the SACB Security Subcommittee in Nairobi (see annex X). In sharp contrast with the United Nations agencies and NGOs that the mission had met in Mogadishu, this group held a negative view of an ongoing United Nations role in facilitating political reconciliation. They expressed their intention to continue their activities after the withdrawal of UNOSOM II.

26. However, the Ambassador of Ethiopia, a member of the Subcommittee, expressed a strongly dissenting view, saying that, while the fatigue of the international community was understandable, immediate abandonment of Somalia by the United Nations was not desirable because there was no infrastructure in Somalia to facilitate political reconciliation or to permit coordination of reconstruction of the country. He added that Somalia's neighbours were too poor to help and that only the international community could do so.

III. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. UNOSOM mandate

27. The Security Council mission concluded that 31 March 1995 was the appropriate date to be included in the Security Council's resolution as the end of the mandate of UNOSOM II. None of the Somali factions requested a longer extension, nor did the humanitarian organizations or NGOs.

28. Withdrawal of the military component of UNOSOM II will be complex and potentially dangerous. Somali cooperation with withdrawal is possible but cannot be taken for granted. Availability of military assets from Member States to cover such a withdrawal will be essential and will, in some respects, determine the completion of the withdrawal. The availability of commercial shipping will also be a key factor if withdrawal is to be orderly and if equipment is to be repatriated. Of overriding importance in this entire exercise will be the safety of personnel.

29. Issues that will arise include possible transfer of certain assets of humanitarian value (e.g. pumps, generators, etc.) to local Somali communities and NGOs.

B. Security Council message to Somali factions

30. The message based on the guidelines agreed to by the Council was conveyed in the form of a prepared statement and its text was given to the faction leaders.

31. The factions were told of the Council's expectation that they would cooperate with UNOSOM's withdrawal and that they understood that the international community's ability to provide humanitarian/reconstruction/

development assistance in the future would depend upon achieving a secure environment. This, in turn, would depend on political reconciliation.

32. The mission made it clear that only a genuinely inclusive approach to political reconciliation was likely to lead to such a secure environment, and therefore that the legitimacy of any unilaterally declared governments would be doubtful.

C. The future

33. The mission confirmed to all concerned Somali parties, representatives of the neighbouring States, and United Nations agencies and NGOs engaged in humanitarian activities, the Council's desire not to abandon Somalia.

34. The humanitarian organizations and NGOs confirmed their intention to continue to operate in Somalia if security conditions permitted. Their views were sharply divided as to whether the United Nations could or should seek to assist in this regard.

35. All Somali authorities and most agencies viewed the ongoing role of the United Nations in providing facilitation and support for the political process as useful. Successful political reconciliation would take a long time and the United Nations should recognize that reality. Security conditions may, however, present problems to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in performing such a role after the UNOSOM military component withdraws.

36. The question of the United Nations role in assisting with security in the post-UNOSOM period was raised. Any such role would require careful consideration by the Secretary-General and the Security Council.

D. Role of neighbouring States

37. The ambassadors of the Horn of Africa countries in Nairobi were briefed on the Council's message to the parties and were urged to use their bilateral contacts to promote genuine national reconciliation and to refrain from supporting any divisive action by any of the Somali factions. The risks of a return to civil war were noted, including the possible impact on regional stability and renewed refugee flows. In that connection, they were also urged to support the Security Council's efforts to have the arms embargo observed.

38. The important role that OAU and other regional organizations could play to ameliorate the situation in Somalia was underlined.

E. Conclusion

39. The visit accomplished its purpose of clarifying the mission's understanding of the issues involved in the critical decision to be taken by the Council. The mission also served the purpose of clarifying the Somali leaders' understanding of the issues involved as well.

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40. The Somali factions received the Council's message with a surprising degree of acceptance.

41. Assurances were given by two divided groups of Somali factions on cooperation with UNOSOM withdrawal, on long-term security for humanitarian assistance and on their intention to bring about genuine political reconciliation.

42. The Somali parties were left in no doubt that the Council would weigh these assurances in the light of their actions.

43. The mission's visit provided a timely opportunity to influence political events in a positive direction. The mission is hopeful that its visit may have had some useful impact.

44. However, everything that the mission saw left its members with a profound sense of unease and a fear that, whether or not UNOSOM leaves, political reconciliation or the emergence of a Government that enjoys widespread acceptance is far from certain. The risk of a return to civil war is real.

45. The Security Council should continue to receive reports and monitor the situation in Somalia, given its role to date, even after the withdrawal of UNOSOM.

Annex I

Guidelines for the Security Council mission

1. The date already foreseen for termination of the United Nations mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) is the end of March 1995. The lack of progress in the peace process and on national reconciliation among Somalis, taken together with the lack of Somali cooperation over security issues, have fundamentally undermined the United Nations objectives in Somalia. In these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM beyond March 1995 cannot be justified.
2. This implies an orderly and progressive phasing out of the military component of UNOSOM in advance of that date. The Somali lack of cooperation with that process is more likely to accelerate it than to retard it.
3. The United Nations will be ready to sustain a facilitating or mediating political role beyond March 1995 if that is what the Somalis want and if they are willing to cooperate with the United Nations.
4. The United Nations will continue to work with regional organizations, in particular the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and with the Governments of neighbouring countries to promote reconciliation in Somalia and the re-emergence of a civil society there.
5. The United Nations will do its best to sustain humanitarian activities throughout Somalia and to encourage non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to do likewise, but their ability to do so will depend almost entirely on the degree of cooperation and security offered by the Somalis.
6. The United Nations will remain ready to provide, through its various agencies, rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance if the situation in Somalia develops in such a way as to make that practicable.

Annex II

Message conveyed by the Security Council mission to the
Somali faction leaders on behalf of the Council

Mogadishu, 26 and 27 October 1994

We have come a long way in order to meet personally with you and deliver a solemn message to you on behalf of the Security Council. This is an exceptional step for the Council to take, matching both the gravity of the situation that now confronts Somalia and the depth of the concern felt by the international community.

In dispatching this mission, the Council wanted to make sure that all the Somali faction leaders, and indeed all Somalis, would realize that their country is at a crossroad and that the Council is about to take decisions that will profoundly affect the future role of the United Nations in Somalia.

The Security Council is faced with a critical decision in view of unusual circumstances. It is essential for all Somali leaders to realize that the responsibility for what will now happen to their country will rest squarely on their shoulders.

You will need to respond to the overwhelming desire of the Somali people for peace and reconciliation. This has been, for the past two and a half years, the path that the United Nations has consistently urged the Somali leaders to follow. At Addis Ababa in 1993 and in Nairobi in 1994 you had all agreed to do so. There is no other path.

In this connection, the Security Council mission wishes to convey to the Somali people, especially its leaders, a sense of the profound disappointment felt by the international community at the lack of progress in achieving political reconciliation and an improvement in the security conditions.

As you know, the Secretary-General has reported to the Security Council that the political reconciliation process is at an impasse. The result has been a vacuum of civil authority and governmental structure. This has left the United Nations with no basis to underpin its efforts to help Somalia to emerge from the present crisis. Security conditions have continuously deteriorated, especially in Mogadishu, and the tragic toll in lives of peace-keepers and relief workers and Somali personnel has continued to rise. As you are also aware, the date already foreseen for termination of the United Nations peace-keeping mission (UNOSOM) is the end of March 1995. In the absence of adequate Somali cooperation, the assumptions underlying the UNOSOM deployment in Somalia have been fundamentally undermined and so have the prospects of achieving the United Nations objectives as set out by the Security Council. In these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM beyond March 1995 cannot be justified.

This implies an orderly and progressive phasing out of the military component of UNOSOM in advance of 31 March 1995. The Security Council mission expects the Somali leaders to cooperate in creating the security conditions that

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will facilitate the phasing-out process. Any lack of cooperation along these lines would be likely to accelerate rather than retard this process. This mission would welcome assurances that every effort will be made to ensure that the security of United Nations personnel and assets will not be put at risk.

The termination of the UNOSOM mandate will not mean that the United Nations will abandon Somalia. The United Nations will be ready to sustain a facilitating or mediating political role beyond March 1995 if that is what the Somali leaders want and if they are willing to cooperate with the United Nations to that end.

For its part, the United Nations will continue to work with regional organizations, in particular OAU, and with the Governments of neighbouring countries to promote reconciliation in Somalia and the re-emergence of a civil society there.

Furthermore, the Secretary-General has asked his Special Representative to continue his efforts to help the Somali leaders to achieve national reconciliation.

However, whether or not the continued efforts at a political settlement bear fruit, the Security Council appeals to all Somali factions and clans to forgo resort to violence as a means of sorting out their differences. The people of Somalia have suffered enough. Their ordeal must come to an end. They long for peace. A resumption of large-scale civil strife would be an indescribable disaster which must be avoided.

In particular, it is essential for the Somali factions at this stage to agree on convening a broad-based national reconciliation conference along the lines set out in the Nairobi declaration of March 1994.

A conference without the participation of all 15 Somali factions that signed the Nairobi declaration, plus the Somali National Movement (SNM), would be a recipe for continued strife and violence and the United Nations could not be a party to a divisive move of this kind. The mission urges all Somali leaders to meet in an inclusive reconciliation conference and to get on with the vital task of forming an interim Government.

The Security Council mission wishes to assure the Somali people that the United Nations, together with its agencies and programmes, will do its best to sustain humanitarian activities throughout Somalia and to encourage non-governmental organizations to do likewise. But their ability to do so will depend almost entirely on the degree of cooperation and security offered by Somalis. Continued attacks and looting will make it impossible to carry on the humanitarian activities effectively.

The United Nations will remain ready to provide, through its various agencies, rehabilitation and construction assistance if the situation in Somalia develops in such a way as to make that practicable. In this regard, the Unified Task Force and UNOSOM take satisfaction in the fact that starvation was stopped in Somalia through the joint efforts of the international community and many Somalis.

Lastly, the Security Council mission wishes to remind the faction leaders that the international community has made tremendous personnel and financial commitments to Somalia. These commitments cannot continue indefinitely, particularly in the absence of a meaningful improvement of the situation. The Council must reassess its involvement in Somalia in the broad context of its world-wide agenda. This is the thought that the mission wishes to impress upon the Somali leaders.

Annex III

Programme of the Security Council mission to Somalia

Wednesday, 26 October 1994

1020 hours	Arrival at UNOSOM II headquarters
1040-1225 hours	Briefing by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, H.E. Mr. James Victor Gbeho
	Working lunch with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and senior members of UNOSOM II
1350-1550 hours	Meeting with Mr. Ali Mahdi and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA)
1730-1955 hours	Briefing by the Force Commander of UNOSOM II, General Aboo Samah Bin Aboo Bakar

Thursday, 27 October 1994

0800-0935 hours	Meeting with General Aidid, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) and associated factions
1050-1110 hours	Press conference
1200-1320 hours	Meeting with United Nations agencies and international NGOs
	Working lunch with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and senior members of UNOSOM II
	Transfer to Nairobi
2005-2030 hours	Press conference
2050-2130 hours	Meeting with representatives of the Horn of Africa Group (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan)
2135-2215 hours	Meeting with members of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB)

Annex IV

List of leaders present at the meeting with Mr. Ali Mahdi
26 October 1994
(titles as presented)

Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed	Interim President
Mr. Abdulkadir Zobe	Vice President
Gen. Mohamed Abshir Muse	Chairman, SSDF
Gen. Adan Abdullahi Nur	Chairman, SPM
Adv. Abdi Muse Mayo	Chairman, SDM
Mohamud Khalif	Vice-Chairman, SNF
Omar Hashi Adan	Vice-Chairman, USC/PM
Mohamed Ramdan Arbo	Chairman, SAMO
Adv. Mohamed Ragis	Chairman, SNU
Adv. Abdullahi Moallim	Head of USC delegate
Mohamed Abdi Hashi	Chairman, USP
Mr. Mukhtaar	Vice-Chairman, SSNM
Mr. Caana Nuug	Vice-Chairman, SDA
Abdinasir Ahmed Adan Serjito	Chairman, USC/SNA (Gyr. Habar Gedir)
Abdullahi Hirsi Drishe	Chairman, SSV (Saleeman/Habar Gedir)

Annex V

Memorandum dated 26 October from the Somali Salvation Alliance

To: The Security Council delegation (by hand)
H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the United Nations
New York

cc: Ambassador Victor Gbeho
Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia
UNOSOM, Somalia

On behalf of the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), we submit to you this memorandum exposing our views on the present political situation, reflecting the deep aspirations of the vast majority of the Somali people who uphold peace, nationalism and democracy and firmly reject all attempts to plunge Somalia back into civil war, tribalism and military dictatorship.

We aim to highlight the relevant factors and crucial issues of the present political situation, putting the emphasis on the indispensable active mediation role that in our view the United Nations is to assume in the ongoing national reconciliation process to ensure the achievement of a just and lasting solution to Somalia's political crisis, which is the common concern of our people and the international community.

Furthermore, we would like to outline herewith our views on major issues of national interest that need to be addressed together with concrete and practical proposals to enhance the reconciliation process, overcome the present standstill caused by the illogical attempt of a minority group to hijack the reconciliation process and dictate its will to the majority. We oppose the present sterile contraposition and animosity among the political factions and favour an innovative problem-solving approach stemming from the mutual comprehension and clear understanding that today the common and unique objective of all patriotic and peace-loving people is to keep the Somali nation from falling back again into the horrors of civil war and starvation.

We would like to take this opportunity, on behalf of the Somali people and the political organizations members of our Alliance, to express to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, H.E. Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and to his assistants, to the Security Council and to the member countries that have contributed in different ways to the United Nations mission in Somalia, in particular to the people and Government of the United States of America, our deep gratitude and sincere appreciation for the historic humanitarian intervention and peace mission to rescue our people and assist Somalia to stand again on its feet and regain its legitimate position among the family of nations.

ON UNOSOM'S EARLY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOMALIA

In our view today Somalia is again at the crossroads. The choice is between genuine reconciliation and permanent confrontation, lasting peace and endless interclan fighting, justice and equality, and total dismemberment of the Somali nation.

The political climate and the security situation in the capital, Mogadishu, and in the country as a whole that showed tangible progress at the beginning of this year has been negatively affected externally by the pressures for the early withdrawal of UNOSOM and internally by the renewed attempt of the SNA group, encouraged by the appeasement tactics of UNOSOM officials, to transform unilaterally the planned national reconciliation conference into a launching pad for the self-proclamation of its military dictatorship.

Clearly the pressures for the abandonment of Somalia in this crucial moment will only favour the forces that oppose the return of Somalia to peace and democracy and that are committed to frustrating the successful accomplishment of the United Nations mission in Somalia and the reinstatement of the United Nations sovereignty and the establishment of a genuine Government of national unity.

The SSA leadership would like to inform the United Nations Security Council mission of the encouraging new positive trends, currently under way, towards the peaceful settlement of the existing political differences through a genuinely broad-based national reconciliation process. In particular we would like to mention here the recent USC/SNA conference and the election of Abdinasir Mohamed Adan "Serjito" as the Chairman of USC/SNA.

We would like to underline to the Security Council mission the fact that UNOSOM's early withdrawal will wholly nullify all the valuable achievements that cost the international community a high toll in human lives and massive inputs of material and financial resources.

ON UNOSOM'S MISTAKES, SHORTCOMINGS AND DEVIATIONS

We are of the opinion that the stubborn opposition and obstruction of the SNA group to the implementation of the Addis Ababa agreements and the Nairobi Conference declaration is the root cause of the present stalemate. The persistent aggressive actions carried out by the SNA against several Somali clans in the central and southern regions, pursuing their declared objectives of territorial expansion, disrupted the progress so far made and the gradual return to normal life achieved by the interclan peace and reconciliation agreements reached by the clan traditional leaders and elders at the regional level, in the central regions, Mogadishu, Kismayo, Dhobley, etc.

The recent events in Hiran region and in Lower Shabelle are clear proof of the escalation of the subversive activities of the SNA, culminating in the unprovoked attack against the UNOSOM military contingents in Beled Weyn and Merka.

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We are seriously disappointed and concerned by UNOSOM officials' continued appeasement attitude and constant submission to SNA group's unchallenged deceptive tactics and diktats to the extent of renouncing its proper active mediation role in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council. In our view this is based on long-standing misunderstanding and misinterpretation of the basic realities of the Somali political situation and society, which erroneously overestimated the role of General Aidid and the SNA group and based UNOSOM's decisions on the baseless assumption of SNA group's "key role" in the solution of Somalia's political crisis. On the contrary, UNOSOM persistently neglected the broad popular support enjoyed by the SSA political organizations throughout the country and systematically downplayed the fundamental role and the principled stand of these political organizations in favour of a peaceful settlement and the rebuilding of Somalia on a new democratic basis.

Notwithstanding the fact that in such a large and complex mission like UNOSOM, errors and deviations are possible, the deviations and shortcomings on the part of UNOSOM officials are beyond any reasonable expectation and are actually jeopardizing the achievement of the ultimate objectives of its mission.

In fact, since the early stage of UNOSOM I, UNOSOM officials constantly pursued a policy of employing in key and sensitive positions officials connected with General Aidid and the SNA group. In spite of the existing hostilities between the SNA group and UNOSOM, General Aidid supporters enjoyed more than 85 per cent of the benefits earmarked for the Somali population in terms of employment opportunities, contract awards and project implementation, house and vehicles' rental.

The officially admitted theft of 4 million United States dollars is evident proof of UNOSOM mismanagement and unaccountability, benefiting on the other hand Aidid's group and penalizing the majority.

The recent SNA attack against the UNOSOM Zimbabwean contingent in Beled Weyn, and the looting of their weapons, ammunitions and military vehicles, met a bland verbal protest and is still unanswered. This behaviour casts serious doubts on UNOSOM officials' connivance with the SNA group, considering the fact that the Zimbabwean contingent of 168 soldiers was not only promptly supported but was ordered to a humiliating surrender, and the call for the immediate return of the weapons, ammunition and military vehicles remained empty words to keep quiet internal and international public opinion.

Furthermore, the fuel used by the SNA in their military attack against Beled Weyn was airlifted by UNOSOM to Galkayo together with a consistent number of persons under the pretext of logistical support to a non-existing interclan reconciliation meeting in Mudug region and the cover of transporting displaced people to their district of origin. The same happened in Merka and Brava in the Lower Shabelle region where UNOSOM military contingents stationed there stepped aside and passively assisted SNA aggression against the civilian population of these towns.

Moreover, UNOSOM officials, deviating from their previous stand of impartiality and respect for Somali political organizations' autonomy as per the

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Addis Ababa agreements, unexpectedly interfered in the internal affairs of SSDF by endorsing arbitrarily the self-appointment of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as Chairman of SSDF in open contrast with the decisions of the SSDF traditional leaders confirming General Mohamed Abshir Muse as the legitimate interim Chairman of SSDF for a period of one year.

This interference will only contribute to further confusing the present situation, together with the unilateral decision of UNOSOM officials to assign to Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf a "mediation role" without the prior consensus of the concerned political organizations and their leaders.

The UNOSOM officials are passively observing the SNA group's manoeuvres and attempting to replace three political organizations signatories of the Addis Ababa and Nairobi agreements, namely SAMO, SNU and SSNM, and their legitimate leaders, with three prefabricated SNA affiliations with the complicity of the SNA "appointed Chairmen".

We also strongly object to the channelling of the allocated fund for the Sool and Sanaag regions through the secessionist authority of the north-west. By doing so we feel that UNOSOM violates both United Nations Security Council resolution 897 (1994) and the recommendations of the donors at the fourth humanitarian conference held in Addis Ababa in December 1993.

UNOSOM's response concerning this subject was that it was pressured by the United Kingdom Government through its mission at United Nations Headquarters.

ON THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESS

The UNOSOM policy of appeasement towards SNA is the cause of the continuous postponement of the Preparatory Meeting of the National Reconciliation Conference planned for 15 April 1994 and the subsequent convening of the National Reconciliation Conference on 15 May 1994 in accordance with the Nairobi Conference declaration of last March.

UNOSOM submitted to the unilateral position advanced by the SNA group under the pretext of the indispensable conclusions of the fifth SSDF Congress in Qardho, the Absame Conference in Dhobley and the SNM request to participate in the national reconciliation process after they reversed their former secessionist stand and now advocated the unity of the country on a federal basis.

The ultimate objective of these delay tactics advanced by General Aidid and accepted by UNOSOM aimed to gain time for his political manoeuvres directed to secure the recognition of the "appointments" of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf as SSDF Chairman, of Colonel Omar Jess as Chairman of the "unified" SPM and of Abdurahman Ahmed Ali as the SNM Chairman.

The above manoeuvres and the clear renunciation by UNOSOM of its active mediation role encouraged General Aidid and the SNA group to embark on a unilateral call for the convening of a national reconciliation conference to

deliberate under their dictate in an attempt to grab political power through undemocratic and deceptive tactics.

We clearly state here that SSA firmly opposes the above manoeuvres and the unilateral SNA call for the convening of a national reconciliation conference organized by it. Our principled stand has always been and still remains the following:

(a) The National Reconciliation Conference should be convened under the auspices of the United Nations and with its active mediation to ensure that its deliberations and agreements will be recognized and guaranteed by the United Nations and the international community;

(b) The National Reconciliation Conference should be preceded by a Preparatory Meeting to decide jointly the date, venue, participation criteria, procedures, chairing, etc.;

(c) Participation in the National Reconciliation Conference will be limited to the following 16 political organizations: the 15 political organizations signatories of the Addis Ababa agreements and Nairobi Conference declaration of March 1994 and SNM;

(d) The political organizations' delegations should include, among others, political leaders, intellectuals, traditional religious chiefs, community elders and women's groups to ensure the broad participation of all social strata;

(e) The earliest date for the convening of the preparatory meeting could be the beginning of November and the National Reconciliation Conference about 20 November. A final decision should be made jointly by all the 16 political organizations after the positive conclusion of their ongoing consultations;

(f) We reiterate our firm commitment to participate in a United Nations-sponsored national reconciliation conference.

We strongly recommend the United Nations Security Council mission to ensure the strict adherence by UNOSOM of the spirit and letter of the Security Council resolutions and support UNOSOM to assume an active mediation role based on genuine impartiality among all Somali political factions in accordance with the agreements of Addis Ababa and Nairobi with the ultimate objective of restoring peace, stability and democracy.

The National Reconciliation Conference will have the priority objectives of reconciling existing political differences on major issues of national interest and pave the way for the establishment of a central Government of national unity that will lead Somalia to free and fair democratic elections within about two years.

In all stages - the consultations, preparatory meeting and during the conference itself - UNOSOM should play an active role of mediator and monitoring, to ensure the adherence of the conference to the agreements of Addis Ababa and Nairobi signed by all the participants. The Conference should reach concrete and functional solutions to the following key issues:

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(a) The future constitutional setup of the Somali State; unitary State/federation, parliamentarian/presidential;

(b) Composition and powers of new State organs: presidency/parliament/central Government/judiciary;

(c) Regional autonomy: power of the autonomous regions and balance of power between the central Government and the regions.

The Conference should deliberate upon and set up specific guarantees against the restoration of military dictatorship and should dissipate reciprocal suspicion and distrust, and reassure specifically the minority social groups and communities about their legitimate worries by setting up also guarantees against clan hegemony that is a legacy of the past dictatorial regime.

ON THE IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM AND GUARANTEES

The setting up of an effective implementation mechanism is an issue of particular concern for the success of the National Conference. The failures and shortcomings of the previous reconciliation conference were due to the lack of an appropriate implementation mechanism agreed upon to follow up and monitor the effective implementation of the agreements reached. Specific and adequate guarantees are indispensable safeguards against violations and breaches of commitments.

In case the peace process does fail, we strongly propose that a Cambodia type of United Nations administration be imposed on Somalia for a period not less than three years so that law and order can be retained. The militia must be disarmed and demining is vitally important. Also this administration will lead Somalia to civic elections.

Annex VI

List of leaders present at the meeting with General Aidid
27 October 1994
(titles as presented)

Mohamed Farah Aidid	Chairman, USC/SNA
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed	Chairman, SSDF
Ahmed Omar Jess	Chairman, SPM/SNA
Mohamed Qanyare Afrah	Chairman, USC
Mohamed Nur Aliyo	Chairman, SDM/SNA
Abdiaziz Sheik Yusuf	Chairman, SSNM/SNA
Sheikh Jama Haji Hussein	Chairman, SAMO
Ismail Bubu Hurreh	Vice-Chairman, SNM
Abdurahman Dualeh Ali	Chairman, USF
Ali Ismail Abdi	Chairman, SNDU
Omar Mungani Aweys	Chairman, SNU
Ahmed Guure Adan	USP
Mohamed Farah Abdullahi	Chairman, SDA

Annex VIIMemorandum dated 27 October 1994 submitted to the Security Council mission to Somalia by the 13 signatories

1. We wish to take this opportunity to welcome warmly the Security Council mission to Somalia, and would like to express our deep appreciation for the continued efforts of the Security Council to assist the Somali people to resolve their political differences. We also wish to express to the delegation our sincere commitment to work towards the achievement of a durable political settlement to restore peace and security in our country and to re-establish in it a broad-based Government which can, with the cooperation of the international community, begin to rehabilitate and reconstruct the economic and social fabric of our society.

2. We are happy to note that the mission has arrived in Somalia at a time when the myth that Somalis were hopelessly divided into two opposing camps has been proven wrong by the recent encouraging developments. The mission has arrived when most of the political leaders representing the vast majority of the people have agreed to resolve their political differences and have taken a common political stand as reflected by the Mogadishu memorandum of 14 October 1994, signed by 12 of the 16 political organizations.

3. We are happy to inform you today that peace and stability as well as a sense of national reawakening are materializing throughout the whole of Somalia, encompassing the northern and southern regions of the country, making the fear of national disintegration, secession and clan warfare recede into the shadows of history, and moving forward the peace process and the prospects for a comprehensive national reconciliation conference. Although the Somali political organizations that are present with you today have contributed to the creation of this hopeful atmosphere, we must admit that it is our people, the Somali masses, whose popular will to overcome the trepidations of civil war and national chaos, has contributed the most to the materialization of this new era that is beginning to dawn in Somalia. The sustained pressure of the international community to prod us towards making peace instead of war has also contributed its share towards the creation of this atmosphere of dialogue and discussion.

4. The Somali political organizations have come a long way from the politics of the gun to the politics of dialogue and discussions and have contributed a great deal towards making peace realizable and security attainable. The political organizations held two major conferences since the beginning of 1993. In the Addis Ababa agreement of 27 March 1993, the Somali political organizations reached an agreement to stop hostilities, disarm the feuding groups and make arrangements that could have led towards the establishment of a transitional national council. In the Nairobi declaration of 24 March 1994 it was agreed to make the necessary arrangements to form a transitional government. In addition to these two major conferences, the political organizations held a series of meetings at the local, district and regional levels to move forward the peace process as well as to reverse the tide of secession in the north of the country in a peaceful manner. Among these meetings were:

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(a) The central region peace conference, held successfully in Mogadishu on 4 June 1993 between SSDF, SNDU and SNA;

(b) The Lower Juba reconciliation conference, held in Kismayo on 4 June 1994;

(c) The Hirab peace conference, held in Mogadishu in January 1994;

(d) The Absame reconciliation conference, held in Doblely in June-July 1994;

(e) The Murusade-Habargidir peace conference, held in Mogadishu in June 1994;

(f) The SNM conference with SNA and the announcement of the end of the secession of the north from the rest of the country on 29 April 1994;

(g) The SNM, SDA, USF and USP northern-based political organizations' Djibouti meeting, from 13-17 August 1994;

(h) The consultations and subsequent declaration of the 12 political organizations to hold a national reconciliation conference on 27 October 1994.

5. The convening of this reconciliation conference is in many ways the culmination of the efforts of the Somali political organizations and the United Nations under the auspices of the Security Council to maintain national unity and find a sustainable political settlement for the Somali problem as a prerequisite for restoring peace and security, re-establishing central government structures and services, and commencing the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction of our country. The conference will work towards the formation of a broad-based transitional national Government with a federal structure to be agreed upon and ratified by the transitional national mechanism as well as a national reconstruction plan with the vision, versatility and applicability necessary to put it into action. We will need the support of the international community and particularly that of the United Nations to work out the details of this plan as well as to find the means to execute it successfully.

6. The convening of this reconciliation conference is also a continuation of the efforts we have made to find a durable political settlement to our problem in the Addis Ababa and Nairobi conferences. The criteria for participation in this conference would therefore be based on the following understanding:

(a) Participant organizations must be members of the 15 signatory political factions of the Addis Ababa agreement of 27 March 1993, plus the participation of SNM as stipulated in the above agreement;

(b) It is important to note here that the agreement specifies that it is the signatory factions as factions per se rather than as individual names that signed for the factions that carry the authority of representation;

(c) In case of change of leadership through a democratic process or means (elections) in any particular faction, the newly elected leader of that faction will thereafter be the legitimate representative leader of the faction in the reconciliation conference, in accordance with the constitution of that faction.

7. As previously agreed upon and accordingly announced on 14 October 1994, the opening of the National Reconciliation Conference was scheduled to take place on 27 October 1994. However, in deference to the request of the Security Council mission to Somalia to meet with the Somali political leaders on 27 October 1994, and in consideration of the wishes of some Somali faction leaders as well as to the appeal of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Somalia, we decided to reschedule the opening date of the National Reconciliation Conference to take place on 1 November 1994. We believe that this postponement will provide all concerned parties sufficient time to express their views on this critically important conference and prepare themselves adequately for it. We call upon all our Somali brothers to respond positively to this gesture and join us in participating in this conference where the problems facing Somalia will be discussed and resolved. We request the international community to give its support and assistance to this forthcoming National Reconciliation Conference.

8. We wish to inform the distinguished members of the mission that, after the opening ceremony of the conference, we will continue consultations with political leaders who are not in the conference until a common understanding on major political issues is achieved. We reject violence as a means of settling disputes between political factions, and we put a high premium on the process of reconciliation through discussions and dialogue. To bring about this process, over 1,000 delegates, observers and guests will attend the conference, representing every segment of the Somali society, including clan elders, religious leaders, women, youth, intellectuals, professionals and local non-governmental organizations.

9. We would like to reiterate our commitment to finding a durable settlement to our current problem. We also believe in the democratic process and adhere to it in resolving national issues. It is the acceptance of the rights of the majority and the protection of the rights of the minority which underlies this process. We constitute 13 organizations of the constituent signatory members of the Addis Ababa and Nairobi agreements. Nevertheless, we are calling upon the remaining three members to join us so that together we could shoulder the responsibility of saving our nation from chaos, warfare and disintegration.

Signatories

1.	SAMO	Sheikh Jama Haji Hussein	Chairman
2.	SDA	Mohamed Farah Abdullahi	Chairman
3.	SDM (SNA)	Mohamed Nur Aliyo	Chairman
4.	SNDU	Ali Ismail Abdi	Chairman
5.	SNM	Abdirahman Ahmed Ali	Chairman
6.	SNU	Omar Mungani Aweys	Chairman
7.	SPM (SNA)	Ahmed Omar Jess	Chairman
8.	SSDF	Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed	Chairman
9.	SSNM	Abdiaziz Sheik Yusuf	Chairman
10.	USC (SNA)	Mohamed Farah Aidid	Chairman
11.	USC	Mohamed Qanyare Afrah	Chairman
12.	USF	Abdurahman Dualeh Ali	Chairman
13.	USP	Ahmed Guure Adan	Chairman

Annex VIII

List of ambassadors of the Horn of Africa countries

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| 1. Ambassador of Djibouti to Kenya | H.E. Saleh Haji Farah Dirir |
| 2. Ambassador of Ethiopia to Kenya | H.E. Ofato Alew |
| 3. Ambassador of Ethiopia and
the Horn of Africa Standing
Committee's envoy to Somalia | H.E. Lissane Yohannes |
| 4. Ambassador of Eritrea to Kenya | H.E. Beyene Russom |
| 5. Ambassador of the Sudan to Kenya | H.E. Elsir Mohammed Ahmed |

Annex IX

List of participants: United Nations agencies and
international NGOs

1. Talib Ali Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations-Somalia Operation
2. M. Devadoss United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization-Somalia
3. Robert Hagan World Health Organization-Somalia
4. Raymond A. Collins Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-Mogadishu
5. E. Hounsokou UNHCR
6. Erling Dessau United Nations Development Programme-Somalia
7. Piet Winnubst World Food Programme headquarters
8. Ferdinando Zanusso WFP-Somalia
9. Raymond Janssens United Nations Children's Fund headquarters
10. Pierce Gerety UNICEF Somalia
11. Beverly Irwin WorldVision International
12. David Neff Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE)
13. Korcky Schaetker International Medical Corps
14. Julian Bauer ECOTERRA International
15. Robert Meredith World Concern
16. Ramos Artiach Médecins sans frontières-Spain
17. Mohamed Abdirahman American Friends Service Committee
18. Alwahab M. Mohamed International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO)
19. Farah Sheikh African Muslim Agency (AMA)
20. Mahamud Ahmed Al-Hamramain Islamic Foundation (HIF)
21. Ahmed Abdulle CARE

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|-----|---------------------|--|
| 22. | Sukyung Yoon | Hisan |
| 23. | Bill Condie | UNICEF |
| 24. | Ibrahim Koroma | United Nations Volunteers/UNDP |
| 25. | Edward Johns | United Nations Conference on Trade and Development |
| 26. | Joe Brunswig | International Civil Aviation Organization |
| 27. | Ken Perkins | International Development and Relief Board (IDRB) |
| 28. | Omar A. Abdi | Muwafaq Charity Foundation (MCF) |
| 29. | J. F. Pietri | Action Internationale contre la Faim |
| 30. | Nancy Smith | Oxfam-UK |
| 31. | Nigel Tricks | Daikonia Caritas Germany (DCG) |
| 32. | De Mey Piet | Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo (CISP) |
| 33. | Ga'al Rashid | CISP |
| 34. | Savorani Guido | CISP |
| 35. | Ali Sheikh Arhi | Somali National Consortium (SNC) |
| 36. | Ahmed Mohamed Ahmed | SNC |
| 37. | Dr. Gutaale | SNC |

Annex X

List of participants: SACB Security Subcommittee

Mr. Sigurd Illing, Chairman, SACB Standing Committee European Commission,
Special Envoy to Somalia

Mr. Giovanni Brauzzi, Vice-Chairman, SACB Standing Committee, Counsellor,
Italian Embassy

Mr. Gerry McCrudden, First Secretary, British High Commission

Mr. Ron Ullrich, Director, United States Agency for International Development,
Somalia

Mr. Jack Hjelt, Deputy Director, United States Agency for International
Development, Somalia

Mr. Basi Papadopoulos, Head of Unit, Horn of Africa, European Commission

H.E. Mr. Lissane Yohannes, Horn of Africa Standing Committee

Mr. Erling Dessau, Resident Representative, UNDP, Somalia

Mr. S. Varadachary, Director, United Nations Development Office for Somalia

Mr. Alexandros Yannis, Personal Assistant to the Chairman, SACB Standing
Committee

2-3 NGO representatives
